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I. INTRODUCTION
Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican have provided us with 
a  fine dialogical study of rational religious belief and its limits.1 They 
argue that unavailability of conclusive evidence of perceived supernatural 
agency and contradictions between various religious belief systems 
render all religious traditions irrational. However, they also recognise 
that empirical research shows that religious belief may in some cases 
have beneficial individual and social effects, therefore they put forward 
a hypothesis of a ‘second-order religious belief ’which would be rational, 
because it would rely one the Fine-Tuning Argument alone and would 
not be bound by the orthodoxies of any specific religious tradition.
One key aspect of religious belief that receives no mention, apart from 
a note in two footnotes (143 and 144, p. 47), is its moral dimension, its 
lived experience. This omission is significant as it undermines the very 
point they want to avoid in evoking the ‘Maxim of the Moon’ which they 
borrow from Buddhism, a religious tradition that values daily practices 
over a rational debate. Their lack of engagement with ethics can make 
Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s hypothesis of a rational ‘second-order 
theistic view’ unappealing to religious believers. Since both authors 
want to reach religious believers (as well as non- or un-believers), their 
position requires revision.
1 Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican, ‘The Common-Core/Diversity 
Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits 
of Rational Religious Belief ‘, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 7, no. 1 
(2015): 1-49. Subsequent references to this work are included parenthetically in text.
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In his extensive reply to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, Janusz 
Salamon argues that their position appears to be incoherent, since their 
second order religious belief based solely on the Fine-Tuning Argument 
cannot serve as a  source of existentially relevant sense of meaning, 
neither can it deliver any other practical benefits, such as comfort in 
times of grief which Thornhill-Miller and Millican (p.  45) identify as 
the motivation of religious commitment.2 He also challenges one of 
their central claims, based on Hume’s insight, that religious pluralism 
undermines rationality of all religious traditions, by pointing to the 
possibility of an epistemically coherent pluralistic interpretation of the 
fact of religious diversity (Salamon 2013, pp.  249-278, Salamon 2003, 
pp. 167-180) and to the possibility of an inclusivist account of religious 
experience (Salamon 2010, pp.  141-175, Salamon 2004, pp.  7-22). He 
suggests that Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s hypothesis of second order 
religion “may be refined by taking into account a view of axiologically 
grounded religious belief ” which Salamon calls ‘agatheism’, since it 
identifies God or the Ultimate Reality with the ultimate good (to agathon) 
(Salamon 2015, p. 197).
For many religious believers relating to the ultimate good takes place 
through engagement in practices, including moral practices. This study 
aims to expand Salamon’s agatheistic position and divert Thornhill-
Miller’s and Millican’s attention to the sphere of morality. It shall start 
by exploring the relationship between theistic and non-theistic reasons 
for being moral and will suggest that settling in this question is more 
relevant to Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s debate than the Fine-Tuning 
Argument. It will argue that both believers and un-believers, even if 
they express their motivation for being moral in different terms, they 
both strive to be moral. Morality or moral formation, a concern for any 
decent human being, whether religious or not, can be a  more fruitful 
starting point for Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s dialogical project. 
Dialogue at the level of morality or the lived experience of rational 
religious beliefs could result in more existentially relevant propositions. 
It could also help them to address the two biases to which they draw 
our attention, egocentric and confirmation, which they claim, are most 
powerful and persuasive biases as they can distort ‘human perception, 
2 Janusz Salamon, ‘Atheism and Agatheism in the Global Ethical Discourse: Reply to 
Millican and Thornhill-Miller’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 7, no. 4 
(2015): 197-245.
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interpretations and judgments’ (32). It’s worth noting that different 
religious spiritualities have powerful resources for addressing these 
biases and for purifying perceptions, illuminating interpretations, and 
altering or improving judgments. Religious stories, spiritual exercises, 
rituals, engagements with the works of art can be more effective in 
addressing our narcissistic tendencies and improving our behaviours. 
However, for Thornhill-Millers and Millican to take on board these 
points would require amongst other things (to which we alluded above) 
a more positive approach to imagination than they seem to hold when 
they endorse Hume’s distinction between imagination and rationality. 
For many theistic and non-theistic philosophers imagination is a  key 
faculty for making sense of our world and it includes both rational as 
well as emotional elements. Engaging with the Maxim of the Moon, to 
which we shall turn next, in an imaginative way can open up a number 
of possibilities which Thornhill-Miller and Millican seem to overlook.
II. THE ‘MAXIM OF THE MOON’: A MORAL READING
Thornhill-Miller and Millican explain that the ‘Maxing of the Moon’ 
warns us ‘against the blinding force of human cognitive bias by suggesting 
that all our pursuits of knowledge – including all our religions – are like 
‘fingers pointing at the moon’. They say that ‘too often we mistake our 
own finger for the moon and allow it to eclipse our view’ (48). They are 
right to warn us about our biases and dangers of projecting our own 
concerns on what is in front of our eyes, however close or distant we 
are to that object. But, there is another way of reading the fingers-Moon 
relationship. One indeed might get stuck and not see beyond one’s 
finger and miss the Moon but one might also get inspired by others who 
point to the Moon and see the Moon for what it is: one’s fingers are not 
alone in the scenario. The shift in our vision can take place thanks to 
a more attentive other who can challenge our perception, interpretation 
and judgement. Sometimes it is enough that one person changes her 
position in order to see more clearly and others move too in order to 
have a clearer vision. The point is that there is much more dynamism in 
the activity of pointing to the Moon than Thornhill-Miller and Millican 
see. It is a relational activity in the same way as the lived experience of 
rational religious belief is. Inspired or energized by others, we might 
eventually reach a moment when we see the Moon and recognise our 
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dependency on it. We may even realize that the Moon is not as distant 
and its influence on the lives of finger-pointers is visible or felt here and 
now. Thornhill-Miller and Millican rightly wonder ‘how much of the 
moon is genuinely revealed by our cultural religious pointers, and how 
much eclipsed by them’. They are also right to suggest that if all fingers 
are removed there could be something sterile and unreal. They propose 
a  third way of dealing with the Moon maxim – ‘another vision of the 
moon, as a luminous, second-order ultimate reality of some kind that yet 
lies beyond the comprehension of all our individual efforts to point to it’ 
(49). This paper argues that the fourth way of relating to the Maxim of 
the Moon is to focus on those who ‘point their fingers’ at a reality that is 
never fully comprehendible yet which influences the lived experience of 
these agents. Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican‘s divisions into neat cultural 
religious and supernaturalist finger-pointers in the direction of the Moon 
or the Ultimate reality (Salamon’s agatheism) existentially (in a sense of 
the moral experience of religious or non-religious individuals) is not as 
tidy. There are both theists and non-theists who believe that God (or the 
Moon as in the maxim we have been considering) are unnecessary for 
the discussion of morality and there are those (theists) for whom God 
is essential element in the discussion. The next part of this paper will 
explore a  sample of these different views. Its aim is to illuminate our 
reading of the Maxim of the Moon.
III. THEISTS AND NON-THEISTS ON MORALITY
Bernard Williams in his Morality: Introduction to Ethics argues that any 
appeal to God in morality ‘either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong 
sort of thing’3. The influential opinion of Otto Pfleiderer, calling for 
a clear separation of ethics from religion, emerged on the eve of the First 
World War in Berlin4. Richard Holloway (former bishop of Edinburgh in 
the Church of Scotland) in his Godless Morality: Keeping Religion Out of 
Ethics agrees with Williams’s point that religion ‘adds nothing’ or that it 
adds ‘the wrong sort of thing’5. A Kantian follower, Christine Korsgaard 
3 Bernard Williams, Morality: Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1972, p. 65.
4 Otto Pfleiderer, ‘Is Morality Without Religion Possible and Desirable?’, The Philo­
sophical Review. 5(1896): 449.
5 Richard Holloway, Godless Morality: Keeping Religion Out of Ethics, Edinburgh: 
Cannongate Books, 1999.
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in her The Sources of Normativity, has developed a  ‘transparent ethical 
theory’, which claims to be neutral to both theism and atheism (similar 
position to the third way of approaching the Moon which Thornhill-
Miller and Millican endorse), and whose success is dependent on the 
idea of transparency understood as a third person perspective (this third 
person, rather than the moral agent or the one with whom the moral 
agent interacts, determines whether the act is right or wrong)6. This 
theory has received mixed reactions. Ton Van Den Beld, who in his ‘The 
Morality System With and Without God’ takes on board Korsgaard’s 
theory as well as both theistic and atheistic approaches, argues that even 
if at one level of human interactions all these approaches articulate what 
morality is about, in the end it is a theistic metaphysic that is capable of 
providing the resources for dealing with ‘inescapable and (sometimes) 
for the agent costly obligations’7. John Cottingham also favours the 
theistic explanation of morality when it comes to dealing with the issues 
of unconditional obligations. However, his view (unlike Van Den Beld’s) 
is, to a large extent, sympathetic to the atheistic position when it comes 
to ‘good-making properties’ which exist in our observable world, in front 
of our eyes, so to speak8. A similar (observation-based) point is made by 
Philippa Foot in her ‘Natural Goodness’, in which she proposes to see 
human goodness as analogous to the goodness of a plant or an animal; 
just as we can say that there is something wrong with a rabbit who fails 
to behave as rabbits do, so we can say that there is something wrong 
with a person who has no interests in being, for example, honest9. We 
are called to be moral by virtue of being human. Shameless or immoral 
people, we can say, are failing to be human. They are failing to see or 
failing to act upon what is in front of their eyes (there may be all kinds 
of reasons for that failure, some might be related to the weakness of 
the will, others to ignorance or to a  deliberate decision not to ‘look’). 
Cottingham considers whether it is enough to say that what we need 
for morality are ‘purely natural features in virtue of which things count 
as good’ (Cottingham 2009, p. 37). Non-theistic philosophers who base 
their approaches to moral theory on arguments from natural sciences 
6 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996.
7 Ton Van Den Beld, ‘The Morality System with and without God’, Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice, 4(2001): 383.
8 John Cottingham, Why Believe?, London: Continuum, 2009, p. 37.
9 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
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clearly support this view. Some philosophers (Peter Railton, for example) 
attempt to answer the normative question of ethics by looking at the 
notion of ‘well-being’ in naturalistic terms and attempts to answer it at 
the level of social explanation. Social scientists too are contributing new 
insights to our understanding of, for example, the idea of moral character, 
which according to Gilbert Harman, has no possibility of having stable 
traits10. Another psychologist Darcia Narvaez draws from neuroscience 
in her discussions of the moral mind and ‘multiple moralities’11. These 
thinkers claim that morality can be worked out on the basis of what is 
observable. This doesn’t mean that our evaluations are always correct; 
clearly, there are disagreements when it comes to assessing what we 
see. Cottingham says that ‘it is right that our pursuit of goodness is 
not a matter of seeing some mysterious extra quality in addition to the 
observable features of actions and objects, but rather involves a careful 
investigation and assessment of their relevant good-making properties’ 
(Cottingham 2009, p. 39). In other words, atheist and theist have the same 
tools for assessing morally right or wrong actions: ordinary observation 
of the world around us and ordinary reasoning about what we see are 
what is needed for making right moral decisions. However, Cottingham 
claims that while this is true there is something missing in this view. 
This missing bit is what he calls ‘conclusive’ or ‘unconditional’ reason for 
choice – ‘one that requires our compliance’ (Cottingham 2009, p. 39). It 
is worth noting that that Van Den Beld makes a similar point with his 
idea of ‘inescapable’ and ‘costly’ obligations.
Cottingham explains his position by asking such questions as: ‘... in 
a  random or impersonal universe, why should the fact that an  action 
oppresses the weak and helpless be a  reason  – a  conclusive reason  – 
against performing it?’ (Cottingham 2009, p.  39). In other words, 
what is this thing that establishes this odd connection between what is 
observable in front of our eyes and this strong normative power which 
requires us to act? According to Cottingham, the theist has an answer: 
‘If God himself is in his essential nature merciful, compassionate, just 
and loving, then when we humans act in the ways just mentioned we 
are drawn closer to God, the source of our being, and the source of all 
10 See Harman, No Character or Personality, http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/
Papers/Character.pdf
11 Darcia Narvaez, ‘Triune Ethics: The Neurobiological Roots of Our Multiple 
Moralities’, New Ideas in Psychology, 26 (2008): 95-119.
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that is good’ (Cottingham 2009, p. 41). He explains that ‘such acts 
command our allegiance in the strongest way, since they bring us nearer 
to the ‘home’ where our true peace and fulfillment lie; and, conversely, 
in setting our face against them, we are cutting ourselves off from our 
true destiny, from the ultimate basis of joy and meaningfulness in our 
lives’(Cottingham 2009, p. 41).
Both Cottingham and Van Den Beld insist that God is what makes us 
go this extra mile for the sake of the other as the conclusive unconditional 
and inescapable obligation. This point is well illustrated in Agnieszka 
Holland’s latest film In Darkness12. Based on the real story of Leopold 
Socha, the sewer worker in Lvov in occupied Poland (now Ukraine) 
during the Second World War, it presents a man, Robert Wieckiewicz, 
who hides Jews in secret underground passageways. Initially, despite the 
obvious dangers associated with helping Jews to survive, Wieckiewicz 
chooses to assist a  Jewish family. We learn that he does so because he 
wants to earn the extra money that the family, who seem to be wealthy, 
offer him for this assistance. He doesn’t come across either as a moral 
hero or a devout religious believer. In fact when we encounter him for 
the first time, he is a greedy man and a chancer. When there is no more 
money left to pay for his services, Wieckiewicz nevertheless doesn’t stop 
what he is doing and, as we see in the film, he is genuinely concerned 
for the life and well-being of those in the sewer. He can’t articulate his 
motivation but he is clear when he says that he can’t walk away. For 
him, the obligation to stay and take a risk is unconditional. (Socha was 
posthumously awarded Israel’s Righteous Amongst Nations title for what 
was considered to be heroic behaviour).
Rowan Williams proposes that in order to do something as 
extraordinary as what we see in Socha’s case, one has to subscribe to the 
idea of a transcendent source of value. In the interview recorded in the New 
Statesman in 2010, Williams argues that ‘to make sense of unconditional 
rights or claims, we need to be clear that there is such a thing as universal 
human nature and that it has some intrinsic dignity or worth. To try 
and ground this independently of the idea of a transcendent source of 
value seems to me not finally feasible’13. Williams refutes relativism and 
12 Agnieszka Holland, In Darknes, film released in 2012.
13 Rowan Williams, Interview with Archbishop Rowan Williams, New Statesman, 19 
July 2010. http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2010/07/interview-religious-human 
[accessed 9 November 2012]
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believes that morality needs a  notion of the sacred. He explains that 
for the Christian this means ‘understanding all human beings without 
exception as the objects of an  equal, unswerving, unconditional love’ 
(Williams 2012).
Fiona Ellis in her God, Value, and Nature attempts to show that 
the naturalist can accommodate the idea of unconditional moral 
obligations, and that he has no need to say that the world we inhabit – 
the natural world – is random, impersonal, and meaningless14. This kind 
of naturalist is to be distinguished from the scientific naturalist, for he 
denies that the scientist has the monopoly on reality, and allows that 
there are values which cannot be comprehended adequately in scientific 
terms. This kind of naturalism is familiar to the work of David Wiggins 
and John McDowell, its framework remains secular, but Ellis argues that 
the position can be extended in a theistic direction, and that Emmanuel 
Levinas’s philosophy offers a way of lending justice to this move. Levinas, 
known for his ‘ethics of the other’, proposes that the only way we can 
relate to God is by being moral; a true meeting of the other in turn puts 
us in touch with Infinity.
It is important in this debate to ask how does a belief in God affect our 
moral responses? Elisabeth Anscombe says: ‘give up religion, let religion 
completely fade away and there will still be morality’15. Human beings 
have always had morality. However, having stated this she immediately 
poses another important question: ‘what morality’? Is her question 
suggesting that if we remove the concept of the sacred or a transcendent 
source of value we won’t have this conclusive and unconditional reason to 
choose? Or does she mean that religion (through its narrative, communal 
practices, appeals to Scripture, codes of behavior, etc.) is the mechanism 
for drawing our attention to this unconditional or inescapable obligation 
to which Cottingham and Van Den Beld refer? Is she anxious that 
without religious beliefs we are in danger of losing the link to that sense 
of unconditional obligation? If we have no belief or understanding that 
such acts as the acts of mercy, compassion, justice, and love (which we 
find in God who acts in this way towards us) call for our commitment, 
do we become impoverished as human beings? It seems that religion is 
14 Fiona Ellis, God, Value, and Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
15 Elisabeth Anscombe, ‘Morality’, in Geach, M. and Gormally, L., (eds), Fatih in Hard 
Ground: Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics by G.E.M. Anscombe, (St Andrews 
Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs), Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008, p. 11.
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capable of providing us (even if religious institutions don’t always foster 
this provision) with a kind of space in which we can form our motivation 
and become passionate about morality. For example, a religious believer 
who believes that God is loving, when she realizes what she is receiving 
from God feels (this phrase is used intentionally here) compelled (in 
love) to give love. This doesn’t mean that being a religious follower she 
will succeed in enacting love but she will have the right motivation for 
acting. Our world history shows that religious people are not immune to 
moral failure. But it seems that the reason for this state of affairs doesn’t 
lie in religion per se but in our shared human condition which is capable 
of both moral success as well as moral failure. Becoming moral is a long 
and often difficult journey and the Moon maxim is rightly warning us 
from reducing this journey to a purely cognitive affair.
IV. RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND MORALITY: CONCLUDING REMARKS
So, ‘how does a belief in God affect our moral responses?’ It seems that 
in the deepest core of religions (we have in mind Abrahamic faiths in 
particular) we are called to be moral so that we can fulfill our God given 
potential to be truly human. Religious beliefs and morality are closely 
intertwined. For many religious believers there is more to their faith than 
the beliefs in miracles or afterlife. This wider notion of a rational religious 
belief is not adequately appreciated by Thornhill-Miller and Millican. In 
fact their approach to religious beliefs, for many religious believers will 
seem reductionist. Religious faith for many believers is broader and less 
staunch and neat. Religious faith, most of all, gives outlook about what is 
important. At the level of motivation, it shapes moral identity of religious 
believers and influences their decisions. But, religious faith doesn’t give 
them the moral tool of right behaviour in every aspect of their daily life. 
A belief in the Transcendent who is the Triune God and who is Love may 
offer to a religious believer a perspective on life in general. It may help 
him or her to form an inner attitude to what they do with their life but it 
doesn’t automatically translate into knowing whether they should spend 
more money on taking a depressed friend out for supper or whether to 
give money to this or that charity. These are individual moral dilemmas 
which an atheist, theist, or non-theist has to resolve. For the theist, there 
is no special line of communication from God from which God will call 
me and let me know what to do. Their relationship with God shapes who 
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they are but doesn’t automatically translate into right decisions. Religious 
faith is often less certain than what Thornhill-Miller and Millican seem 
to suggest in their paper. The vast majority of religious believers live 
constantly with a tension between doubt and certainty, but they live with 
the hope that God somehow holds everything together, and (as the Moon 
in the Maxim) influences their existence. Religious faith fills religious 
believers with hope that they will be able to recognize and act upon 
unconditional obligations but their individual religious beliefs are not 
a guarantor that they will. Many religious believers (including the author 
of this paper) don’t see miracles in the way Thornhill-Miller and Millican 
describe. Miracles are more extraordinary in the mundane: love, peace, 
natural world, a smile on the face of a refuge, a joy of music, the pleasure 
of friends, the moments of prayer – these are what we see as sparks of God 
in their existence. For many religious believers the notion of afterlife is 
a total mystery. In Christianity, the Kingdom of God is amongst us (not 
in some distant future). Salvation is embodied and present in every act of 
humanization; every act of dehumanisation calls for salvation. Bringing 
the human and the moral into the discussion of a religious belief would 
be a  welcome move and the next step in the valuable dialogue which 
Thornhill-Miller and Millican initiated and Salamon is taking forward.
The above sample of possible ways of approaching of the relationship 
between religion and morality illustrates not only the complexity of the 
topic but also points to the wealth of responses and arguments which can 
inform or extend Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s approach. We haven’t 
fully resolved the religion-morality question and are leaving it in the state 
as Plato’s Euthyphro which ends with an unresolved dilemma. Socrates 
points out that Euthyphro, his dialogue partner, who is an  expert on 
religious matters, cannot clearly explain whether something is pious or, 
in the language of the Divine Command Theory, morally right, because 
God commands it or God commands it because it is pious or morally 
right. The dialogue ends when the frustrated Euthyphro leaves. Perhaps 
the unresolvedness here is significant. For the theist, it gives not only 
a sense of consolation that the question of God and morality is indeed 
complex and perhaps we should not feel bad that we can’t grasp it fully. 
Furthermore, it invites us to accept that although God becomes knowable 
to us (in Christianity through Incarnation), God is also a  Mystery. 
Finally does it really matter whether God commands something because 
it is good or it is good because God commands it? Can we be satisfied 
with the idea that God commands or that God is in charge? As in the 
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Maxim of the Moon, the Moon is there whether we see it or not. Perhaps 
a  more important question for working out in detail is how God’s 
commandments or God’s will are mediated to us. The answer to this 
question is necessary if our discussions on particular moral matters are 
to be constructive. Thornhill-Miller and Millican provide space for such 
a discussion in their second order theistic view.
It seems that there are religious reasons for being moral: because 
being moral is the will of God or it is to imitate God or it is an act of love 
for God. For example, it makes no sense if religious believers subscribe 
to their religious stories but fail to realize that life is a good gift or that 
every human being is precious or that the natural environment is to be 
respected or that that the poor, the weak, and the marginalized are to be 
especially protected. This, for many religious believers, is the ‘logic’ of 
their faith. And, this logic is not alien to those who don’t subscribe to the 
theistic framework. A moral framework based on rationality and love is 
possible for theists, non-theists and atheists. However, as Richard Harris, 
in his Re­Enchantment of Morality: Wisdom for a Troubled World, argues 
religion makes morality attractive16. So perhaps it is time to re-discover 
the wisdom of religious traditions, look for new and creative ways to 
re-enchant morality,  ignite the passion for morality, and expand our 
interpretation of the Maxim of the Moon.
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